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Oberauer and colleagues report the results of an ambitious project to identify key or 
'benchmark' empirical findings that have been associated with the concept of working 
memory. An impressive range of findings is presented with the stated intention that the 
selection is as a-theoretical as possible, while classifying each finding according to whether 
or not it should be given high, medium or low priority to be explained by a generalisable 
theory of working memory. The three levels of priority are allocated by a combination of 
ratings from a wide range of working memory researchers and a consensus judgement by the 
authors. 
There are at least two broad ways in which a collection into one place of an integrated set of 
brief descriptions of such a wide range of empirical findings could be a useful resource for 
researchers who consider themselves to be studying working memory. One of these, as stated 
by the authors, is to help development of theory and, in particular computational modeling of 
the concept of working memory by focusing on a common set of agreed empirical 
phenomena that should be explained by any such model or theory. There is indeed 
considerable merit in this, because genuine advances in cognitive theory generally, not just 
working memory, suffer from a lack of focus on common paradigms and common research 
questions, as well as from a lack of a broad agreement on the definition of what, precisely, is 
being studied. Major advances in economics, physics, evolutionary biology, and genetics 
along with many other sciences arise from multiple researchers and teams of researchers 
worldwide all focusing on the same, or a very similar research problem, even if they 
approach the problem from different directions. Working memory theory could certainly 
benefit from this kind of mass action. However, for this to work, it would be essential that 
individual theorists do not simply try to reinterpret findings to fit their favored theoretical 
framework, or change a parameter of an existing computational model without questioning 
the assumptions from which the model was developed. By focusing on the ‘A’ category of 
well established phenomena that have been thoroughly researched and replicated, there is a 
serious risk that working memory theorists will have already considered many of these, and 
will already have arguments as to how their favorite theory can explain them. This then 
simply encourages the proliferation of theories, rather than seeking common theoretical 
ground. Also, by focusing on explanation, theory development can become overly post-hoc, 
and circular, rather than integrative and predictive. 
 
A second way, not considered by the authors, in which an integrated, and systematic 
presentation of empirical findings could be useful is in highlighting findings that some 
researchers might not have considered, or of which they had been unaware. This could serve 
as the basis for innovation in developing new paradigms, new methodology, and making new 
discoveries about the nature and functioning of working memory. Moreover, we would want 
our theories to predict novel empirical results rather than only to provide post-hoc 
explanations for known results. If this paper is successful in encouraging working memory 
theory development to focus on the ‘A’ category findings that have already been thoroughly 
researched, the result could be an overly conservative approach, leading to an endless cycle 
of scientific stagnation rather than scientific advance. By focusing on explanations for 
existing, well-established findings, category B and category C phenomena would become 
consigned to the electronic file drawer, and this would be accompanied by a rapid reduction 
in studies that seek out new findings, or more integrative theories that make novel 
predictions. Placing Category C findings in an Appendix will serve to accelerate their demise. 
It is not uncommon for new empirical findings to be serendipitous, forcing a reexamination 
of current theory, and development of new sets of predictions to be tested. Thus to ensure that 
we encourage innovation and genuine advance in knowledge, there is a strong argument that 
theory development should focus on the ‘B’ category findings, coupled with serious 
consideration of the ‘C’ category when developing theories and models. This is where we are 
most likely to find the results that are inconvenient for existing theories, and that should be 
addressed in theory development while assessing whether they can be replicated. Within this 
paper, by definition, each C category phenomenon has been reported by perhaps just one 
group of researchers, possibly driven by one particular theoretical framework. It is all too 
easy for researchers who favor an alternative theoretical framework to dismiss category C 
findings as not relevant or of less interest than category A findings that might be more 
tractable for existing theories. A good example of a potentially very important, but possibly 
inconvenient finding in the category C appendix is 13.4 ‘Short-Term Retention Without 
Measurable Neurally Active Representations’. This finding presents a major challenge to 
theories that assume a lack of observed activation relative to a control condition means that 
the region of interest is not involved in supporting task performance. It suggests that 
maintaining a representation in working memory (rather than encoding or retrieving) will not 
necessarily be evident in the BOLD signal. This kind of finding also highlights how crucial it 
is to consider behavioral data and cognitive theory when interpreting the results of brain 
imaging. It is not alone in the C category Appendix as a finding with important theoretical 
implications. 
 
A further reason for taking C category phenomena out of an appendix and placing them front 
and center, is that they may have found themselves with their lowly status because few 
researchers have addressed these phenomena. There is a strong element of a popularity 
contest in allocating phenomena to the A category. A democratic approach might not be the 
best approach to science, even if it dominates citation and download counts (which have their 
own flaws as metrics of quality and importance). This simply reflects the number of people 
who work, or have worked on those phenomena, and of course, the more people who work on 
a phenomenon, the more conceptual and actual replications there will be, and the more 
citations there will be to the published reports of those phenomena. It is also a concern that 
each researcher who contributed to these ratings will have her or his own priorities based on a 
particular theoretical perspective. Findings that are common, and have already been 
addressed within multiple theoretical frameworks will receive many votes. Findings that are 
important for a specific theory but have not been considered within other theories will only 
receive votes from the research group associated with that theory. There may be many such 
findings, each with small numbers of votes from different groups of researchers, hence they 
become consigned to the B or C category. Many of the A category items may not be those 
that need to be addressed because they have already been addressed extensively. So the 
survey results and the replication criteria that were used together to generate the A, B, and C 
category findings are not independent, and aggregation of the ratings may be extremely 
misleading. Being in the A category does not mean that these are the most important 
phenomena for theory development. It could be that they are the easiest to explore 
experimentally, and/or are studied by a large number of researchers who share theoretical 
assumptions. It could also be that because these findings are already well established, 
researchers who are new to the field feel obliged to study them, thereby further increasing the 
community of researchers studying particular phenomena. Developing new ideas, new 
paradigms, and new, integrative theory is risky when developing an academic career. 
Individual researchers or groups could, of course, continue to generate novel avenues, 
findings and theory, but research funding and publishing present substantial challenges when 
the research is not in line with the current ‘zeitgeist’, or dominant paradigm and assumptions. 
Publication of the categorization, rather than an uncategorized repository of findings, will 
exacerbate this bias towards studying well established findings with existing theory rather 
than making a new contribution to knowledge and understanding. 
 
There are also what might be called the ‘category D’ findings that have not been included. 
The authors are explicit about excluding a range of studies that have addressed what might be 
called ‘applications’ of working memory, for example in the study of reasoning, mental 
arithmetic, and language development. This certainly makes the current exercise more 
manageable, given the very large number of published studies that purport to study working 
memory. Arguably, such studies are of less interest if the primary goal is to develop 
computational models of working memory, rather than, say, a computational model of mental 
arithmetic. However, in the spirit of the question that motivated Baddeley and Hitch (1974), 
‘What is it for?’, we might expect that any conceptual (verbal/boxes and arrows) theory, or 
computational model ought to be able to predict as well as simulate and explain patterns of 
findings from these studies of how working memory might be used in everyday cognition. 
Arguably, this would be a stronger test of a theory than a focus on more artificial tasks that 
generate many of the category A findings. 
 
Within what I refer to as ‘category D’ are many neuropsychological findings that are 
excluded by default rather than on principle. Benchmark 13.2 considers preserved working 
memory in amnesia, but there is no consideration, even in the C category, of the cases of 
impaired working memory with intact long-term episodic and semantic memory. Most of 
these cases appear to have specific impairments of immediate, serial ordered verbal recall 
(e.g. Basso, Spinnler, Vallar, & Zanobio, 1982; Warrington & Shallice, 1969; see reviews in 
Vallar & Shallice, 1990), but some other brain damaged individuals show intact verbal 
immediate recall, but impaired memory for novel visual or spatial stimuli (e.g. Beschin, 
Cocchini, Della Sala, & Logie, 1997; Logie, Beschin, Della Sala, & Denis, 2005; for reviews 
see Della Sala & Logie, 1993; Logie, 1995; Logie & Della Sala, 2005). These kinds of 
findings from studies of selective impairments have made important contributions to the 
development of the multi-component theoretical framework of WM (e.g. Baddeley & Logie, 
1999), yet tend not to be considered by researchers who develop alternative theories. It may 
be that researchers who work with these kinds of patients are not comfortable with the idea of 
prioritizing findings based on how well established they are or how many votes they 
attracted, and therefore chose not to contribute to the benchmark project. However, it is a 
great pity that the authors did not consider including such findings, not least because they 
offer the intriguing possibility of simulating focal damage within computational models to 
explore whether the ‘damaged’ models generate the observed patterns of cognitive 
impairment and sparing in multiple single case studies of brain damaged individuals. 
 
The argument thus far has focused on the issue of which of the three categories developed by 
Oberauer et al. should be given highest priority. However, while having a comprehensive 
collection of research findings could be an extremely useful resource, it is not clear that 
assigning any kind of differential priority labels to different findings helps our understanding 
of working memory or helps theory development. The decision to assign high, medium and 
low priority to each finding is, at first glance, entirely rationale. Findings that have been 
replicated multiple times, and that have been ranked highly by researchers who have chosen 
to contribute to these rankings are given the highest priority. However, as argued above, it 
may be the findings that are novel, or have been shown in only a small number of studies, or 
tend to be considered only within one theoretical framework that could be the most 
informative, and offer the greatest potential for substantial advances in working memory 
theory. 
 
An alternative, and potentially much more useful approach could be to provide an 
uncategorised repository of findings, with the A, B, and C labels removed, along with 
encouragement for researchers to give serious consideration to the potential merits of 
impartial comparison of alternative theories. The selection of findings for this comparison 
could be driven by the theories that are to be compared, not by how widely known are the 
findings. For example, Theory 1 might be associated with a particular set of Findings X, 
whereas Theory 2 might be associated with a different set of Findings Y. Theory 1 would 
then be set the challenge of addressing Findings Y, and Theory 2 would attempt to address 
Findings X. Findings X and Y would be selected from those considered important for 
Theories 1 and 2, not by the A,B,C categorization for generalised priority. There might be 
requirements to modify the paradigms commonly used by Theory A and Theory B for the 
purposes of this comparison, and each theory would be set the task of generating its own sets 
of predictions in advance, to avoid the temptation to develop post-hoc explanations for 
unexpected data patterns. It would be essential that researchers associated with each theory 
remain open-minded about the possibility that neither theory will predict the results. This 
opens the opportunity for a step change in theory development to emerge in a new, more 
integrated Theory 3, that can account for, and would have predicted both findings X and Y. 
This kind of theory comparison is very different from the common practice in cognitive 
psychology of making predictions from one theory, and designing experiments to test those 
predictions. Also common is to set up an alternative theory against which to assess a favored 
theory, but with a paradigm that most often gives some advantage to the favored theory. 
 
The fact that genuinely impartial theory comparison is rare in cognitive psychology was 
noted over 30 years ago by Watkins (1984), who suggested that cognitive theories are like 
toothbrushes: fine for individual use, but we would rather not use one belonging to someone 
else. Gigerenzer (2010) developed this concern by noting that we teach our students how to 
test a theory, but we tend not to teach students how to construct a theory. Moreover, 
Gigerenzer claimed that often labels and descriptions of phenomena, or statements of 
dichotomies are presented as theories, so that we develop new labels for phenomena rather 
than making major new theoretical advances. Maybe our goal should be for a theory to act, 
not like a toothbrush, but more like recipes that we are happy to share with others, that can 
incorporate a range of well established and new empirical ingredients, and through impartial 
co-operation between competing chefs may be integrated to develop new dishes from both 
familiar and newly discovered ingredients. 
 
This approach will most likely require abandoning some long-held assumptions, and the 
outcome also might conflict with powerful introspections about our conscious experience of 
our own working memory in action. A long time ago Pylyshyn (1973) noted that not all 
conscious experience is necessarily functional in cognition, nor is all that is functional in 
cognition available to consciousness (for further discussion see Logie, 2016; Logie & Cowan, 
2015). 
 
The authors have a potentially, extremely valuable resource, which could become even more 
valuable over time, but giving the highest priority to the most established findings, and  
excluding or diminishing the status of less widely reported findings could hinder, rather than 
facilitate theory development. Moreover, the text would have benefitted from cross 
referencing between benchmarks that would have helped readers to navigate among the 
various findings within and between categories. For example, is there any consistency 
between findings from neuroscience and neuropsychology, and behavioural findings 
regarding the effects of distracters in serial ordered recall? An integrative theme throughout 
that highlights consistencies and inconsistencies across different methodologies as well as 
across different paradigms would be much more helpful to the working memory community. 
Setting a major research agenda based on high priority for well established findings 
inevitably sidelines the new, but less well established findings that might be just as, if not 
more important for theory development than those that have been studied extensively. 
 
In sum, I am not convinced that the aim of attempting to identify benchmark findings in 
working memory and the imposition of differential ratings of importance for each finding is 
of benefit to the working memory research community, and may be a formula for slowing 
progress theoretically and empirically, by stifling innovation in developments of 
methodology or in the generation of new findings that are crucial elements for advancing 
knowledge. However, if the benchmark theme were to be dropped, then the collation in a 
regularly updated and comprehensive web-based repository of cross-referenced published 
findings that have been subject to rigorous peer review could be a very valuable resource. 
Such a repository would help avoid ‘reinvention of the wheel’ when researchers report as 
new, a finding that was reported some time ago. It could be dynamic not only by adding new 
findings, but also by deleting or ‘flagging’ findings that suffer from multiple failures to 
replicate. Most important, it would act as a resource for developing, new, more integrated 
rather than fractionated theory. 
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